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CAN THE TAXING POWER BE 
DELEGATED? 
Peter W. Hogg* 
I.  THE POWER TO TAX 
Both the Parliament of Canada and the legislatures of the provinces have the 
power to levy taxes. In the case of the Parliament, the power is conferred by 
section 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867,1 and it extends to “any mode or 
system of taxation”. In the case of the Legislatures, the power is conferred by 
section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and it is limited to “direct taxation 
within the province”.2 For the most part these powers are not interpreted or 
applied any differently than other legislative powers that are distributed by the 
Constitution Act, 1867. But section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 does single 
out the taxing and spending powers by providing that a bill imposing any tax or 
spending public monies “shall originate in the House of Commons”. Section 54 
goes on to provide that the House of Commons shall not enact a bill for the 
spending of public monies unless the bill was recommended by message of the 
Governor General. By virtue of section 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867, 
sections 53 and 54 apply to the provinces as well as to the federal government 
with appropriate modifications to the language. 
The special treatment of the taxing and spending powers has its origin in the 
conflict between the King and Parliament in England in the 17th century. De-
mocratic governance required that the powers  
to tax and spend be approved by the elected House of Commons. Experience 
showed that, if the King was not dependent on Parliament for supply, the King 
would be able and willing to govern without reference to the House of Com-
mons; in other words, the unelected King was free to govern without regard for 
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1
 The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
2
 An account of the taxing powers is to be found in Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 
(4th ed., 1997), ch. 30. 
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the wishes of the people. As we shall see, this archaic problem is not entirely 
without its modern counterpart. 
Sections 53 and 54 of the Constitution Act, 1867 constitute manner and form 
requirements for the enactment of bills to impose taxes (or spend public mon-
ies). Do they also impose substantive restrictions on the powers to tax? In 
particular, do they preclude Parliament or the legislatures from delegating the 
power to tax? 
II.  DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
The general rule of Canadian constitutional law is that Parliament and the 
legislatures have the power to delegate their legislative powers.3 This doctrine 
also had its origin in 17th century England, where the courts denied the power 
of the King to make new laws of his own initiative, but accepted the King’s 
power to make laws if he acted pursuant to a delegation enacted by Parliament. 
Democratic governance was sufficiently preserved if the law-making of the 
King and his ministers was circumscribed by Parliament itself. Canadian courts 
accepted the same doctrine, permitting Parliament to delegate its powers to the 
Governor in Council, to ministers, to officials or to administrative agencies. 
There was initially some controversy as to whether the provincial Legislatures 
enjoyed the same power, but the courts held that they did, so that the 
Legislatures were permitted to delegate to the Lieutenant Governor in Council, 
to ministers, to officials, to municipalities, to school boards and to 
administrative agencies. In fact, extraordinarily sweeping powers were 
delegated by Parliament to the Governor in Council in the War Measures Act, 
under which Canada was governed during both world wars, and those powers 
were upheld by the courts.4 The provinces have also from time to time engaged 
in sweeping delegations of legislative power, for example, to establish 
marketing schemes, and these have been upheld.5 
There are some limits on the power to delegate legislative power,6 but none 
that are relevant to the present topic. For present purposes, it may be assumed 
that the power to delegate legislative power is unlimited. The question is 
whether the power to tax is in a different category as the result of the require-
ment of section 53 that a bill imposing a tax must originate in the House of 
Commons (or provincial Legislative Assembly). A tax levied under a delegated 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
 An account of the law respecting delegation is to be found in Hogg, supra, note 2, ch. 14. 
4
 Re Gray (1918), 57 S.C.R. 150. 
5
 Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, [1938] A.C. 708. 
6
 The important one is the prohibition on federal inter-delegation, namely, the delegation of 
legislative power from Parliament to the provinces and vice versa: see Hogg, supra, note 2, ch. 14. 
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power would not originate in the House of Commons. The policy argument 
against permitting delegation of the taxing power is that a delegation reduces 
the democratic control of taxation by permitting taxes to be imposed or in-
creased secretly — without the normal public debate in the legislative assem-
blies. We shall see that this concern persists to this day. 
III.  DELEGATION OF THE POWER TO TAX 
There have been three cases in which the Supreme Court of Canada has 
considered the question whether the taxing power could be delegated. Each 
case has yielded a different (and inconsistent) answer. The first case is 
Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act.7 In that case, a 
constitutional attack was mounted against the levies on farmers that were 
imposed by marketing boards. The boards were created under authority granted 
in a federal statute, and the statute empowered the boards to impose levies. The 
argument was that the levies were taxes which could not be imposed by a 
delegated body. The Court held that the levies were not taxes (they were 
administrative or regulatory charges), so there was no need to resolve the issue. 
But Pigeon J. for the majority of the Court in an obiter dictum answered the 
question anyway. He acknowledged that section 53 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 appeared to be a bar to the delegation of the taxing power. But he pointed 
out that section 53 could be amended by the federal Parliament alone,8 and he 
said that any delegation by Parliament of the power to impose taxes should be 
regarded as an implicit amendment of section 53. Therefore, the taxing power 
can be delegated. This reasoning is open to criticism. So long as section 53 has 
not in fact been amended, it surely ought to be obeyed. The fact that section 53 
can be amended ought not to justify its being disregarded, which is what the 
theory of implied amendment allows. 
The second case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has considered 
whether the taxing power could be delegated is Eurig Estate (Re).9 In that case, 
the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a probate fee imposed by the prov-
                                                                                                                                                              
7
 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198. 
8
 At that time, the power of amendment was in s. 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 
31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (hereinafter Constitution Act, 1867). That provision has been repealed and 
replaced by s. 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 (hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982), which would also authorize the amendment by 
Parliament alone of s. 53 or s. 54. 
9
 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565. On the issue of the effect of s. 53, the majority opinion of Major J. 
was disagreed with by both the concurring opinion of Binnie J. (who struck down the tax on 
administrative-law grounds) and the dissenting opinion of Bastarache J. (who would have upheld 
the tax).  
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ince of Ontario on the estates of deceased persons. The probate fee was levied 
by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, acting under a statutory power to im-
pose “fees” in court proceedings. The Court unanimously held that the probate 
fee had as its main purpose the raising of revenue (as opposed to defraying 
expenses) and was therefore a tax. The Court by a majority then held that the 
tax was invalid for failure to comply with section 53 of the Constitution Act, 
1867. Justice Major speaking for the majority, held that section 53 “ensures 
parliamentary control over and accountability for taxation” by “requiring any 
bill that imposes a tax to originate with the legislature”, and prohibiting “any 
other body other than the directly elected legislature from imposing a tax on its 
own accord”.10 Moreover, section 53 “is a constitutional imperative that is 
enforceable by the courts”.11 What of the obiter dictum in the Agricultural 
Products Marketing case that any inconsistent legislation should be upheld as 
an indirect or implicit amendment of section 53? Justice Major said that the 
dictum should no longer be followed. It was true that section 45 of the Consti-
tution Act, 1982 empowered a provincial Legislature to amend the constitution 
of the province, and it was also true that the requirement of section 53 was a 
provision that could be amended under that power, but section 45 should be 
interpreted as requiring that any such amendment be direct or express, not 
merely indirect or implied.12 The probate fee, being a tax that had not been 
imposed by the legislature itself, was therefore invalid.13 
Eurig Estate (Re) did not have to decide the question whether the taxing 
power could be delegated. The Ontario legislature had enacted a statute dele-
gating the Lieutenant Governor in Council the power to levy “fees” in court 
proceedings, but it had not delegated the power to levy a tax. “Therefore”, said 
Major J., “whether it could constitutionally do so does not need to be ad-
dressed.”14 However, in an earlier passage, Major J. implied that the answer 
was no, because he said:  
                                                                                                                                                              
10
 Id., paras. 30 and 32. Justice Bastarache, dissenting, took the view that s. 53 was addressed 
only to the relationships between an upper and lower house; since no province had a bicameral 
legislature anymore, s. 53 had become redundant in its application to the provinces (para. 54). 
Justice Binnie, concurring in the result, took a similar view that s. 53 was applicable only to “legis-
lative procedure”, and if a taxing measure never took the form of a “bill” s. 53 had no work to do 
(para. 60). 
11
 Id., para. 34. 
12
 Id., para. 35. 
13
 The province immediately enacted the Estate Administration Tax Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 
34, to impose a tax at the same rates and on the same base as the probate fee, and made the legisla-
tion retroactive to 1950, when the probate fee had first been imposed by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council. 
14
 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 565, para. 36; see also para. 39. 
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my interpretation of s. 53 does not prohibit Parliament or the legislatures from vest-
ing any control over the details and mechanism of taxation in statutory delegates 
such as the Lieutenant Governor in Council.15  
With respect, the facts of the Eurig case demonstrated quite dramatically that 
it should not be possible for the taxing power (apart from details and mecha-
nism) to be delegated. Once a taxing power has been delegated, the resulting 
taxes do in practice escape the democratic accountability that occurs when a 
bill is introduced in the legislative assembly. This was demonstrated quite 
clearly by the history of Ontario’s probate fee. It had been increased tenfold 
since 1950 when the power was vested in the Lieutenant Governor in Council, 
and the last increase, which was a tripling of the rate in 1992, was quietly im-
posed by order in council after the government of the province publicly an-
nounced that there would be no further increases in taxation!16 
The third case in which the Supreme Court of Canada has considered the 
question of whether the taxing power can be delegated is O.E.C.T.A. v. Ontario 
(Attorney General).17 In that case, the question was whether the power to fix the 
rate of Ontario’s property tax for education could be delegated. The property 
tax was imposed by statute, but the statute stipulated that the rate was to be 
fixed by the Minister of Finance. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
power to fix the rate was an essential element of the power to tax so that a 
delegation of the power to tax had indeed occurred. And the Court went on to 
hold that, while only the legislature could create a new tax, the imposition of 
the tax could be delegated so long as the delegation was contained in a statute 
in language that was “express and unambiguous”. The “democratic principle” 
was preserved by the fact that “the legislation expressly delegating the imposi-
tion of the tax must be approved by the legislature.”18 In this case, the Minis-
ter’s power to set the rate of the property tax was contained in the Education 
Act in express and unambiguous language. The delegation was therefore valid. 
The Ontario English Catholic Teachers case cannot easily be interpreted as a 
case in which only the “details and mechanism” of taxation were delegated. 
The phrase “details and mechanism” was never referred to, and the literal read-
ing of the Court’s opinion is that even an essential element of the power to tax 
can be delegated without offending section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It 
seems therefore that, after the twists and turns of Agricultural Products Market-
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 Id., para. 30 (emphasis added). 
16
 None of these increases had anything to do with inflation, because the rate was an ad val-
orem one, consisting of a percentage of the value of the estate, which would of course automatically 
rise with inflation. 
17
 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470. Justice Iacobucci wrote the opinion of the Court. 
18
 Id., para. 74. 
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ing and Eurig, the Court has finally provided an answer to the question whether 
the taxation power can be delegated. The answer, however, is the wrong one. 
While it is clearly established (and obviously necessary) that other legislative 
powers be subject to delegation, the taxing power is distinctive. It is distinctive 
for the legal reason that section 53 singles it out for the requirement that any 
bill must originate in the House of Commons. Admittedly, that is not the clear-
est possible declaration that delegation is prohibited, but a prohibition on dele-
gation is, it is submitted, implicit in section 53. It must be remembered that the 
taxing power is the one upon which the rest of governance depends. As the 
King and Parliament both recognized in the 17th century, nothing important 
can be done without resources, and it is control of the taxing power that pro-
vides the resources. Moreover, no other power has as direct and immediate an 
effect on citizens as the taxing power, and (for that reason) nothing government 
does is as unpopular as the imposition and collection of taxes.19 There is a huge 
incentive for governments to offload this power to a delegate, who can raise 
taxes quietly without any irritating fuss in the Parliament or Legislature, and 
who can shoulder the blame when the media do get wind of the action. The 
action of the government of Ontario in 1992 in tripling probate fees by order in 
council after having publicly promised to stop raising taxes perfectly illustrates 
the mischief of delegation in the case of the taxing power. The Court should 
have interpreted section 53 as prohibiting the delegation of this primary instru-
ment of democratic governance. 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
 I take this to be a proposition for which no authority is needed, but consider the Goods and 
Services Tax, which continues to be unpopular despite the fact that it has been in force for more 
than a decade, that the (Progressive Conservative) government that introduced it has been defeated, 
and the current federal (Liberal) government’s only sin is its failure to repeal it! 
(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) Can the Taxing Power be Delegated? 311 
 
  
  
 
Part V Federalism .............................................................................. 303 
CAN THE TAXING POWER BE DELEGATED? .......................... 305 
I.  The Power to Tax ................................................................... 305 
II.  Delegation of Legislative Power ........................................... 306 
III.  Delegation of the Power to Tax ........................................... 307 
 
 
